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THE PERVASIVE APPROACH TO TEACHING
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
STANLEY A. SAMAD *
An article that deals essentially with pedagogical method may
suggest an area of concern unique to the law teacher. Yet the prob-
lems of developing professional responsibility through the law school
are of vital concern to the practitioner as well as the pedagogue. The
American Bar Association, the National Conference of Bar Ex-
aminers, and law teachers, through the Association of American Law
Schools, have long concerned themselves with the nature and effec-
tiveness of law school instruction in professional responsibility.
However, the views of the professional associations and those of the
law teachers heretofore have not been characterized by rapproche-
ment regarding the effectiveness of such training.
The American law schools, happily, have gained a monopoly on
legal education. That they have not acquitted themselves well in
training for professional responsibility has been suggested by Dean
Albert Harno, former President Ross Malone, Professor Brainerd
Currie, and others. In his epochal survey of legal education, Dean
Harno reported, "The statement is frequently made that legal
education as administered in law schools is deficient in teaching
legal ethics." ' Legal ethics as used in this quotation probably refers
to the broader concept of professional character or responsibility.
Professor Currie, in commenting on the future of legal educa-
tion, pointed to the lack of progress in effectuating civil rights during
the first half of the twentieth century and the related censure of the
Supreme Court of the United States by ninety-six senators and
congressmen-of whom seventy-four were law-trained individuals
representing thirty law schools-as demonstrative of the failure of
law schools to train for professional responsibility. His suggested
solution was instilling an "indefinable fundamental," an acute
awareness of the role of lawyers in society. The responsibility, he
observed, "is not a matter that can be parcelled out and assigned to
certain members of the faculty at certain hours, but is the job of all
law teachers all of the time." 2
* Dean, University of Akron College of Law.
H -arno, Legal Education in the United States 155 (1953).
2 Currie, "Law and the Future: Legal Education," 51 Nw. U.L. Rev. 258, 271
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In addressing the Michigan Conference on Legal Education in
1959, President Ross Malone commented on the results of a law
school survey on teaching legal ethics. "On its face then," he stated,
"there is a situation in which no organized effort is being made to
teach the subject of professional responsibility and professional
ethics in over half of the accredited law schools in the United States
today." ' "This is a situation which to me is shocking," he added.4
In fairness to the law schools, it should be noted that Malone's
comments were evoked by a yes-or-no response to a question going
to the existence of a course in legal ethics or legal profession. Instruc-
tion in the legal profession may be taught in such a concentrated,
single course package or it may be taught pervasively throughout all
or a substantial part of the curriculum. Instruction in professional
responsibility may likewise be effectuated through honor systems
and through extracurricular activities such as legal aid clinics,
student bar associations, case clubs (moot court) and legal fraterni-
ties. However, the remainder of President Malone's remarks indi-
cated his belief that law schools without a concentrated course on
the legal profession were only giving lip service to pervasive treat-
ment of the subject.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ETHICAL INSTRUCTION
To turn for a moment to the precursors of the modem American
law school, the English Inns of Court doubtless instilled the tradi-
tions and etiquette of the legal profession by precept and example.
Similarly, the apprenticeship system of training in the United States
afforded the same method of instruction. "It produced," observed
James Grafton Rogers, ". . . a contact between the preceptor and
the apprentice which secured some measure of professional outlook,
character and ethical training." '
The Litchfield Law School, the predecessor of the American
law school, did not include among its lectures a course in legal
ethics or its equivalent.6 Significantly, Professor David Hoffman in
1836 in his memorable outlines for the study of those who read law
included moral and political philosophy and professional deport-
ment among his thirteen outlines.7 Among the works recommended
by Hoffman were those by Bentham, Locke, Grotius and Puffendorf,
and Ecclesiastes, The Barrister, and The Life of a Lawyer. Again,
3 Joiner (ed.), The Law Schools Look Ahead 73 (1959).
4 Ibid.
5 61 A.B.A. Rep. 924 (1936).
6 For a listing of the subject-matter headings of the Litchfield Law School, see
Reed, Training for the Public Profession of Law 453 (1921).
7 Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study (2d ed. 1836).
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the technique was to teach by precept and example, albeit vicari-
ously. Hoffman also commended his fifty resolutions of professional
conduct to the law student. These resolutions were forerunners of
the first code of professional ethics.
In the interim between Hoffman's resolutions and the adoption
of the Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, Judge George Shars-
wood in 1854 delivered his memorable lectures on legal ethics to the
law class of the University of Pennsylvania. 8 Sharswood postulated
proper professional conduct in light of English case law and history,
morals and reason. Sharswood's technique is likely to be ridiculed
by the modern, sophisticated teacher and law student as sermoniz-
ing.
Upon the adoption of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the
American Bar Association called upon the law schools to teach a
course in professional deportment and legal ethics.' A survey by
the Association of American Law Schools indicated that thirty-two
schools taught legal ethics as a regular part of the curriculum,
whereas sixty schools did not. A typical response by a Dean of a
law school that did not teach legal ethics in a concentrated package
was:
We hear much about teaching of ethics in law schools. This is
well. But it is exceedingly difficult to harangue morality into un-
willing ears. The best and most effective course of ethics ever
given in any law school is the daily life of a faculty whose mem-
bers are without fear and without reproach. Teaching ethics is
good; living ethics before one's class is incomparably better.' 0
The American Bar Association was unimpressed by such argu-
ment. In 1917, as a part of a systematic endeavor to elevate the
standards of the profession, it resolved that there be instruction of
applicants to the bar in proper ethical standards."
In 1927, the Professional Ethics and Grievances Committee
again concluded that the subject of professional ethics did not re-
ceive sufficient place in the lawyer's scholastic education. 12 On the
motion of that Committee, the Association in 1929 "moved that it
is the sense of this Association, and it so places itself on record, that
a compulsory course in and the teaching of professional ethics be a
part of the curriculum of all law schools." 13
8 Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics (2d ed. 1860), republished as 32
A.B.A. Rep. (1907).
9 "Teaching Ethics in Law Schools" in 2 Am. L.S. Rev. 377 (1910).
10 Townes, "Organization and Operation of a Law School," 2 Am. L.S. Rev.
436, 439 (1910).
11 Wickersham, "The Moral Character of Candidates for the Bar," 9 A.B-A.J.
617 (1923).
12 52 A.B.A. Rep. 351, 355 (1927).
13 54 A.B.A. Rep. 147 (1929).
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The Association of American Law Schools gave sympathetic
consideration to the resolution, but refused to require of its members
the teaching of a formal course in legal ethics.14 The Professional
Ethics and Grievances Committee had concluded earlier that the re-
luctance of the law teachers' association stemmed from opinions that
the law schools had little influence in molding character, that legal
ethics were ideals incapable of attainment, and that a required
course violated the value of a law student's freedom of choice in se-
lecting his program of study. 5
The resolution of the American Bar Association in 1935 that
written bar examinations include questions on legal ethics and that
committees on character and fitness orally examine applicants to
the bar on their knowledge of professional conduct was probably
another, and indirect, attempt to induce the law schools to offer in-
struction on the subject.16 The National Conference of Bar Examin-
ers passed a similar resolution. 17
During the years immediately preceding the war and through
the war years, the matter lay dormant. But in 1946, the Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law Committee of the American Bar Association
unveiled a plan to suppress the unauthorized practice of law. One
aspect of the plan was to promote the competency of lawyers in the
practice of administrative law by encouraging law school instruction
in public law subjects;' 8 another was to encourage law schools to
stress the importance of eliminating unauthorized practice and of
observance of the obligations of Canon 47 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics.19
That Committee entered into discussions with the Committee
on Co-operation with the Bench and Bar, Association of American
Law Schools. The upshot was the creation of the Joint Conference
on professional responsibility composed of five members from the
American Bar Association and five law teachers representing the
Association of American Law Schools. The Joint Conference resolved
to attack the problem on a much broader front than that suggested
by earlier surveys and dialogue. The areas of inquiry were profes-
sional ethics, unauthorized practice of law, judicial administration
and more broadly, "an analysis of the responsibilities of the lawyer
in (his) various roles." " Materials for instruction and instruction
itself were to be explored.
'4 See "Report of A.A.L.S. Proceedings for 1929," in 6 Am. L. S. Rev. 722 (1930).
15 See Wickersham, supra note 11.
16 60 A.B.A. Rep. 90 (1935).
17 Bierer, "Retrospect and Prospect," 7 Bar Exam. 131, 134 (1938).
18 71 A.B.A. Rep. 207 (1946).
19 Id. at 210.
20 A.A.L.S., 1954 Proceedings 104 (1955).
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The breakthrough toward the solution of the problem of train-
ing for professional responsibility came through the Boulder Con-
ference on Education of Lawyers for Their Public Responsibilities,
called in 1956 by the Special Committee on Education for Profes-
sional Responsibility, Association of American Law Schools. That
Committee's report well describes the principal items of the agenda:
"Values basic to a free society; function of the legal profession in
respect to their protection; relation of legal education to them, in-
cluding obligations, opportunities and obstacles, together with train-
ing processes and suggested means for attainment of objectives." 21
ARTICULATION OF THE PERVASIVE APPROACH
Although convened by a law teachers' association, the conferees
of the Boulder Conference included four practicing lawyers and
four laymen-a physician, a political scientist, an officer of a great
education fund, and a Professor of Religious Thought, the late Dr.
Edwin E. Aubrey of the University of Pennsylvania. Among the
recurring problems of the Conference, the most persistent was the
extent to which ethical values could be effectively inculcated by
means of existing subject-matter courses in contrast to the concen-
trated approach employed in Legal Ethics, Legal Profession and
similarly entitled courses. The difficulty of resolution was not in-
surmountable once the principle was brought sharply into focus.
The late Dr. Aubrey, speaking from a lifetime of experience in
teaching about religion, was perhaps the leading proponent of
the former approach. It was he, in fact, who referred to it as the
"pervasive approach," a term that commanded immediate accept-
ance. As he viewed it, any conventional subject-matter course,
not necessarily what is known as a "practice course," will provide
a succession of opportunities for the introduction of questions and
comments on values that are essentially ethical.22
The Boulder Conference thus identified the central meaning of
the pervasive approach-dialogue about ethical and professional
problems as the opportunities present themselves in the context of
any law school course, rather than the relegation of that dialogue to
a single course.
So considered, it may appear that the pervasive approach to
teaching professional responsibility is simply old wine in new bottles,
for some law schools have been teaching professional responsibility
pervasively for years. But what is new in the concept is the notion
of planned permeation of all or a substantial part of the law school
21 A.A.L.S., 1956 Proceedings 159 (1957).
22 Stone, Legal Education and Public Responsibility 8 (1959).
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curriculum with ethical and professional problems. Professor Robert
E. Mathews, Chairman of the Boulder Conference, recognized this
when he referred to the pervasive approach as the "systematic,
planned introduction of ethical values and standards into non-ethics
courses." 23 He added, "If (the law teacher) will take a few hours
from a busy week and analyze his course case by case and class-note
by class-note, he will be amazed at the discoverable number of
ethical issues that are implicit in every hour of class discussion . . .
that pervade, in fact, the entire course." 24
IMPEDIMENTS TO UTILITY
The participants of the Boulder Conference were acutely aware
of several possible impediments to the usefulness of the pervasive
approach. The law faculty of Vanderbilt University, which is con-
ducting an experiment in this method, was also aware of certain
limitations.' That experiment may reveal on empirical grounds
other possible limitations, but three major problems are already
too clear.
First, the cardinal value influencing the selection of teaching
materials in the law school curriculum is the fitness of the materials
"for teaching the tough intellectual methods of technical law" and
not the fitness of the materials' ethical content.26 In fact, most case-
books contain little ethical content, although many of the problems
that they raise provide the opportunity for ethical discussion. Thus
supplementary materials must be prepared by the instructor for use
in his course. A brilliant example of what can be done to solve this
problem is Professor Murray Schwartz's Materials on Professional
Responsibility and the Administration of Criminal Justice" to com-
plement the standard criminal law course and casebook.
A second problem concerns the attitude, receptiveness, and
ability of law faculty members to bridge both the technical and
ethical problems in a given course. Will Professor X, a specialist in
real property, consider himself competent as a teacher of professional
responsibility? Does he have the time, or will he take the time, to
prepare the ethical content? Is his personality such that he will
effectively inculcate professional idealism, or will he cynically deni-
grate it? Certainly a minimum condition for the success of the per-
vasive approach is widespread faculty support of it.
23 Mathews, "Education for Professional Responsibility," 21 La. L. Rev. 140,
148 (1960).
24 Id. at 149.
25 Smedley, "The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale-'The Vanderbilt Ex-
periment'," 15 J. Legal Ed. 435 (1963).
26 Stone, op. cit. supra note 22, at 301.
2 7 These materials were published in 1962.
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A third problem is control and evaluation of the teaching of
professional responsibility by the pervasive approach. Control over
faculty members' methods of teaching is slight and evaluation of
the effectiveness of teaching at any level of higher education is
difficult, but control and evaluation are even more difficult when
the pervasive approach replaces a concentrated course in ethics.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE PERVASIVE APPROACH
A recent report by the American Bar Association Foundation
showed that about four-fifths of the approved law schools indicate
the use of an unplanned pervasive approach in varying degrees,
whereas the planned pervasive approach with specially prepared
materials is used in less than a dozen schools."' However, the report
suggests that use of the planned pervasive approach is on the in-
crease. The Foundation's report also indicated that the planned
pervasive approach does not in fact permeate the entire curriculum,
but is most commonly associated with the courses in criminal law,
procedure, torts and trusts. In addition to these courses, the Uni-
versity of Chicago has extended the method to courses in adminis-
trative law, corporations and federal taxation. The Vanderbilt
University School of Law includes conflict of laws, contracts,
conveyances, family law, insurance, labor law, security (mort-
gages) and taxation, as well as criminal law and evidence in the
catalogue of appropriate courses. The Harvard Law School has
developed problems emphasizing professional responsibility for use
in its freshmen Group Work Program, a tutorial program that also
deals with legal research, writing and the preparation and trial of
hypothetical cases. This catalogue of efforts shows that there is no
subject-matter limitation on the application of the pervasive ap-
proach.
CONCLUSIONS
The writer agrees that training for professional responsibility
is "the job of all law teachers at all times" and not something to "be
parcelled out and assigned to certain members of the law faculty at
certain hours." 2" Training for professional responsibility by the
planned pervasive approach offers a teaching technique more effec-
tive to instill an appreciation of the role of the lawyer in modem
society than the course in Legal Ethics so frequently and vigorously
demanded by the bar, because training for professional responsibility
includes legal ethics and much more.
28 Lamborn, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (1963).
29 See Currie, supra note 2.
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A rearticulation of a professional educational goal and a tech-
nique which tends to implement that goal is, however, only a be-
ginning. The more complex problems of understanding the forces
that mold professional character and deciding how the law schools
may use this understanding remain. Happily, these areas of inquiry
are not being neglected by the law teacher. 30 But progress in these
areas-and others-is predicated to a large extent upon the pro-
fession's understanding the complex process of molding professional
character, including the status of new teaching methods, and upon
the law schools' abiding concern with the problem of teaching
professional responsibility.
30 See Watson, "Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional Respon-
sibility," 16 J. Legal Ed. 1 (1963).
